


Knowing the Territory



Basic Legal Guidelines for Washington City and County Officials

Knowing the Territory

Basic Legal Guidelines for Washington City and County Officials

Municipal Research & Services Center of Washington
1200 5th Avenue, Suite 1300 • Seattle, WA 98101-1159
(206) 625-1300
mrsc@mrsc.org • www.mrsc.org




Foreword

This is the sixth revised and updated edition of this handbook, which was first published in 1984.

This publication has a dual purpose: to serve as a primer for newly elected and appointed officials and to be a convenient general handbook for city and county officials.

We trust that this updated version, reflecting current statutory and case law developments, will continue to be a valuable resource to municipal officials.

We are grateful to Robert F. Hauth, the original author of the publication; Robert Meinig, who worked on this edition; and to the other members of MRSC's legal staff for their assistance in updating this publication. We are also grateful to Holly Martin, Desktop Publishing Specialist, who prepared the text for publication.


A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "R. Yukubousky". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Richard Yukubousky, Executive Director
Municipal Research & Services Center of Washington

Contents

Basic Powers	1
The Separation and Distribution of Governmental Powers	1
Nature and Powers Generally	1
► Counties and Cities	1
► Officers	2
The Separation of Powers Doctrine	2
► Background	2
► Application of the Doctrine	3
Basic Duties, Liabilities, and Immunities of Officers	5
In General	5
The Public Duty Doctrine	6
Duties as Trustees or Fiduciaries	6
Custodians of Public Funds – Absolute Liability	7
Potential Conflicts and Ethical Guidelines	9
The Prohibition Against Mid-Term or Post-Election Pay Increases	9
Prohibited Uses of Public Office – Conflicting Financial Interests	10
► In General	10
► Code of Ethics in Ch. 42.23 RCW	10
► The Statutory Prohibition Against Private Interests In Public Contracts (ch. 42.23 RCW)	11
Dual Office-Holding	16
► In General	16
► Statutory Provisions	17
► The Judicial Doctrine of Incompatible Offices	17
The “Appearance of Fairness Doctrine” in Hearings	18
Prohibited Uses of Public Funds, Property, or Credit	21
Constitutional Prohibitions	21
► In General	21
► Prohibition Against Gifts/Lending of Credit	21

Statutory Prohibition – Using Public Office Facilities for Political Purposes	23
Competitive Bidding Requirements	25
In General	25
Penalties for Violations of Competitive Bid Law	26
The Open Public Meetings Act	27
In General	27
The Purpose of the Open Public Meetings Act, Ch.42.30 RCW	28
Applications	28
Key Definitions	29
Two Kinds of Meetings	30
► Regular Meetings – RCW 42.30.060-.075	30
► Special Meetings – RCW 42.30.080	30
Place of Meetings	31
Conduct of Meetings	31
Executive Sessions – RCW 42.30.110	32
Minutes – RCW 42.32.030	34
Violation/Remedies	34
Open Government, Public Records, Privacy	35
In General	35
Purpose of the Public Disclosure Law	36
Broad Definition of Public Records	36
Duties of Public Agencies (State and Local)	37
What Records May Be Withheld?	37
Procedures for Access – Remedies	39
Immunities from Tort Liability	41
Role of the City Attorney and Prosecuting Attorney, and Legal Ethics	43
Safeguards and Precautions	45
Conclusion	47
Appendix A Summary of Washington Appear of Fairness Doctrine Cases	
Appendix B Selected List of Articles Relating to Legal Ethics for the City Attorney and Prosecuting Attorney and Related Topics	



Basic Powers

The Separation and Distribution of Governmental Powers

It is essential for effective local government that municipal officials, especially county commissioners, mayors, councilmembers, and city managers, understand the roles of their respective offices and their inter-relationships with others. This brief discussion is meant to provide some basic guidelines in order to promote harmony and avoid unnecessary conflicts.

Nature and Powers Generally

► Counties and Cities

Cities and towns are created under our constitution and general laws as “municipal corporations.” Wash. Const. art. XI, § 10; RCW 35.02.010; 1 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 1.20 (3rd ed. 1987). (Because their nature and structure are essentially the same, we will refer to both cities and towns, generally, as “cities.”) Counties are also established under the state constitution as political subdivisions of the state. Wash. Const. art. XI, §§ 1, 3. They are considered municipal corporations, or, at least, quasi-municipal corporations. *King County v. Tax Commission*, 63 Wn.2d 393, 398, 387 P.2d 756 (1963).

As corporate entities, cities and counties are capable of contracting, suing, and being sued, like private corporations. As “municipal” corporations, however, their functions are wholly public. They are, in a sense, incorporated agencies of the state, exercising local governmental powers. 1 McQuillin, *supra*, § 2.08, at 142.

Counties, cities, and other municipal corporations are creatures of the state, exercising only powers delegated to them by the constitution and laws of the state. Under article 11, section 11 of the state constitution, cities and counties possess broad “police power” to legislate for the safety and welfare of their inhabitants, consistent with general law. (Charter cities incorporated under article 11, section 10 of the state constitution, code cities under Title 35A RCW, and charter counties under article 11, section 4 of the state constitution exercise a broader degree of self-government or “home rule” than do others.) Additionally, when exercising a “proprietary” (business) function, such as the operation of electrical or water service, a city’s or county’s powers are more liberally construed than when exercising a “governmental” function, such as taxation. *Tacoma v. Taxpayers*, 108 Wn.2d 679, 693-96, 743 P.2d 793 (1987). All counties and cities, however, are subject to limitations imposed expressly or impliedly by state law. *Snohomish County v. Anderson*, 123 Wn.2d 151, 158-59, 868 P.2d 116 (1994); *Massie v. Brown*, 84 Wn.2d 490, 492, 527 P.2d 476 (1974).

► Officers

Regardless of how broad the powers of a municipal corporation may be, its officers have only those powers that are prescribed by law. 3 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 12.126 (3rd ed. 1990); *State v. Volkmer*, 73 Wn. App. 89, 93, 867 P.2d 678 (1994); *Brougham v. Seattle*, 194 Wash. 1, 6, 76 P.2d 1013 (1938). The powers of a mayor or city manager, for example, are – even in a code city – limited to those powers that are delegated by law to that particular officer.

When statutes are unclear as to whether or why the board of county commissioners, city council, or the chief executive officer should exercise a particular power or function, resort to fundamental principles may be helpful. One such principle is embodied in the separation of powers doctrine, described in the next section.

The Separation of Powers Doctrine

► Background

Under our political system at both federal and state levels, governmental powers are distributed among three separate branches or departments: legislative, executive, and judicial. In that respect, as in many others, city government is structured like state government. The city council’s role is analogous to that of the legislature in establishing local public policy; the mayor or manager, like the governor, heads the executive branch.¹ The municipal court exercises essentially judicial functions; however, its role is more limited than those of state courts.

¹In cities having the commission form of government, the law appears to combine legislative and executive functions in the same body. However, those functions are actually still divided as the city’s legislative powers are exercised solely by the commission as a body; while each commissioner, in his or her capacity as an executive officer, is also the administrator of a separate city department. RCW 35.17.010. There is only one remaining commission city in the state, Shelton.

County government, other than in some charter counties, is structured similar to the city commission plan of government. The board of county commissioners, like the county commission, possesses both legislative and executive powers. Some of the charter counties have established the board of county commissioners or county council with legislative powers only and have created a county executive position that exercises executive powers.

City and county governmental structure reflects the philosophy now firmly embedded in our society known as the “separation of powers doctrine.” Under that doctrine, each of the three branches exercises certain defined powers, free from unreasonable interference by the other branches; yet all branches interact with and upon each other as a part of a “check and balance” system. *In re Juvenile Director*, 87 Wn.2d 232, 238-44, 552 P.2d 163 (1976).

As the court in *In re Juvenile Director, supra*, points out, the doctrine is embraced in the philosophy of our founding fathers and has been embodied since, expressly or impliedly, in the constitutions of all of the states and of the United States. It is an essential part of our form of government, one which is flexible and adaptable to change. While not a definitive guide to intergovernmental relations, it is a dominant principle in our political system.

► Application of the Doctrine

The issue in *In re Juvenile Director, supra*, involved the authority of a board of county commissioners, under its generally expressed legislative power, to establish (and, accordingly, limit) the salaries of superior court personnel, as well as the salaries in other county departments. The supreme court held that the board possessed that authority, and that the superior court had not succeeded in demonstrating (as it must) that the board’s action in this particular instance had interfered unreasonably with the court’s essential judicial function.

In Washington cities and counties, the council or commission, as the legislative body, establishes local laws and policies, consistent with state law, usually through the enactment of ordinances and resolutions. The council or commission also exercises general oversight and control over the jurisdiction’s finances, primarily through the budget process.


In cities, it is ordinarily the council’s function to create subordinate positions, prescribe duties, and establish salaries. *See, e.g.*, RCW 35.23.021; 35.27.070; 35A.12.020; and 35A.13.090. However, the appointment of such subordinate officers is usually, if not always, the express prerogative of the executive. *See, e.g.*, RCW 35.23.021; 35.27.070; 35A.12.090; and 35A.13.080. And, although the council has general supervision over the city’s operations, neither that body nor its committees or individual councilmembers should attempt to exercise powers that are assigned by law to the executive branch. In fact, in cities operating under the council-manager form of government, the law expressly forbids councilmembers from interfering in certain administrative matters, although the council may discuss those matters with the city manager in open session. RCW 35.18.110 and RCW 35A.13.120.

The executive branch of a city, headed by the mayor (or the manager in those cities having a council-manager form of government), is responsible for the day-to-day administration of city affairs.

Generally, the responsibility for employing, disciplining, and dismissing department heads and employees is assigned to the chief executive officer, subject to any applicable civil service provisions, such as chapters 41.08 and 41.12 RCW. However, in some instances the law may expressly authorize the city council to appoint or approve (confirm) the appointment of a particular officer. For instance, the council appoints and discharges the city manager. RCW 35A.13.010; 35A.13.120; 35.18.010; and 35.18.120. Certain mayoral appointments are or may be made subject to confirmation by the council. See RCW 35.23.021 and 35A.12.090 for other examples of those statutory or optional provisions. On the other hand, a council's power to confirm an appointment does not include the power to "veto" a subsequent dismissal of that appointee.

The scheme is somewhat different in counties. The various county elected officials (commissioners, prosecutor, assessor, auditor, clerk, treasurer, coroner, and sheriff) have the authority to establish subordinate positions and appoint people to fill those positions; however, this can be done only with the consent of the board of commissioners.² RCW 36.16.070. The commissioners fix the salaries for those positions. *Id.* Each elected official (and the commissioners as a body) has executive authority and supervises the day-to-day administration of their "departments." The board of county commissioners has no authority with respect to the daily operation of the offices of the other elected county officials.

²The board of county commissioners may create and fund employee positions in the offices of the other elected county officers, but it may not decide who can be hired to fill those positions. *Osborn v. Grant County*, 130 Wn.2d 615, 622, 926 P.2d 911 (1996).



Basic Duties, Liabilities, and Immunities of Officers

In General

Public officers and employees are generally accountable for their actions, like other persons, under civil and criminal laws. See *Babcock v. State*, 112 Wn.2d 83, 105-06, 768 P.2d 481 (1989). There are additional statutory provisions and case law governing the conduct of public officials, including: state and federal civil rights laws such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ethics and conflict of interest laws (chs. 42.20 and 42.23 RCW); penalties for violations of the Open Public Meetings Act (ch. 42.30 RCW), or for violations of competitive bid laws (RCW 39.30.020), to name only some of them.

Under the common law principle that “The king can do no wrong,” which prevailed in Washington until 1961, the state and its municipalities were themselves immune from civil liability for their negligent acts or omissions (“torts”). *Kelso v. Tacoma*, 63 Wn.2d 913, 914, 390 P.2d 2 (1964). However, by a series of enactments between 1961 and 1967, the legislature virtually abolished that concept. Section 1, chapter 164, Laws of 1967 (RCW 4.96.010) provides:

All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation. Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the

commencement of any action claiming damages. The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

Case law continued to recognize a narrow ground of immunity for a municipality and its officials from tort actions, but only for what was described as a “discretionary act involving a basic policy determination by an executive level officer which is the product of a considered policy decision” (e.g., a decision by a city council to enact a particular ordinance). *Chambers-Castanes v. King County*, 100 Wn.2d 275, 282, 669 P.2d 451 (1983).

In 1987, the state legislature enacted what is now RCW 4.24.470, providing in part as follows:

(1) An appointed or elected official or member of the governing body of a public agency is immune from civil liability for damages for any discretionary decision or failure to make a discretionary decision within his or her official capacity, but liability shall remain on the public agency for the tortious conduct of its officials or members of the governing body.

This new statutory language appears to grant somewhat broader immunity to city and county officials than the supreme court’s language in previous cases summarized earlier in this section.

The Public Duty Doctrine

Some additional immunity is provided in case law by the “public duty doctrine.” Under that doctrine, where a city or county’s duty is owed to the public at large (such as for general law enforcement), an individual who is injured by a breach of that duty has no valid claim against the city or county, its officers, or employees. There are certain exceptions; e.g., in cases where a special relationship is created (such as when an officer or employee makes direct assurances to a member of the public under circumstances where the person justifiably relies on those assurances); or when an officer or employee, such as a building official, knows about an inherently dangerous condition, has a duty to correct it, and fails to perform that duty. *Taylor v. Stevens County*, 111 Wn.2d 159, 171-72, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).

There are other protections from tort liability, such as insurance and indemnification, that are available to municipal officers and employees, even though the municipality itself may be liable. These other protections will be discussed under a later heading.

Duties as Trustees or Fiduciaries

Courts have held public office to be synonymous with public trust and that a public officer’s relationship with the public is that of a fiduciary. *Northport v. Northport Townsite Co.*, 27 Wash. 543, 548-50, 68 Pac. 204 (1902). The state legislature expressly recognizes that relationship in various statutes discussed in this work: e.g., ch. 42.23 RCW; and the Open Public Meetings Act, ch. 42.30 RCW. The people themselves, in passing Initiative 276 (ch. 42.17 RCW) by a 72 percent


popular vote in 1972, likewise declared trust to be the public policy of the State of Washington. For example, RCW 42.17.010 states in part:

- (2) That the people have the right to expect from their elected representatives at all levels of government the utmost of integrity, honesty and fairness in their dealings.
- (3) That the people shall be assured that the private financial dealings of their public officials, and of candidates for those offices, present no conflict of interest between the *public trust* and private interests. (Emphasis supplied.)

Custodians of Public Funds – Absolute Liability

Understandably, the law places upon treasurers and other custodians of public funds the strictest of all duties. Case law in Washington and other states holds that custodians of public funds are actually insurers; they and their bonding companies are absolutely liable for any losses of public funds in their custody, except for “acts of God” (floods and similar natural catastrophes), or “acts of a public enemy” (war). *State ex rel. O'Connell v. Engen*, 60 Wn.2d 52, 55, 371 P.2d 638 (1962). The surety bonds (“official” bonds) that must be posted by those and other officers are to protect the public, not the officer. RCW 42.08.080; *Nelson v. Bartell*, 4 Wn.2d 174, 185, 103 P.2d 30 (1940).³ For personal protection, insurance may be available for officers and employees who act in good faith. This subject will be discussed in more detail in a later section of this handbook.

³The law requires the premiums on such official bonds to be paid by the county, city, or other public agency served. RCW 48.28.040.



Potential Conflicts and Ethical Guidelines

The Prohibition Against Mid-Term or Post-Election Pay Increases

As a means of preventing the use of public office for self-enrichment, the state constitution (article 11, section 8) initially prohibited any changes in the pay applicable to an office having a fixed term, either after the election of that official or during his or her term. However, by Amendment 54 (article 30), adopted in 1967, and an amendment to article 11, section 8 (Amendment 57) in 1972, the rule was modified to permit pay increases for officials *who do not fix their own compensation*. In other words, members of governing bodies which set their own compensation still cannot, during the terms for which they are elected, receive any pay increase enacted by that body *either* after their election *or* during that term. The prohibition is not considered to apply, for example, to a mayor's compensation, unless the mayor actually casts the tie-breaking vote on the question. Mid-term or post-election *decreases* in compensation for elective officers are entirely forbidden by article 11, section 8 of the constitution.

The term "compensation," as used in that constitutional prohibition, includes salaries and other forms of "pay" but does not include rates of reimbursement for travel and subsistence expenses incurred on behalf of the municipality. *State ex rel. Jaspers v. West*, 13 Wn.2d 514, 519, 125 P.2d 694 (1942); *see also State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle*, 7 Wn.2d 443, 461, 110 P.2d 162 (1941).

Prohibited Uses of Public Office – Conflicting Financial Interests

► In General

Our state supreme court, citing principles “as old as the law itself,” has held that a councilmember may not vote on a matter where he or she would be especially benefitted. *Smith v. Centralia*, 55 Wash. 573, 577, 104 Pac. 797 (1909) (vacation of an abutting street). And, with some exceptions described later in this section, statutory law strictly forbids municipal officials from having personal financial interests in municipal employment or other contracts under their jurisdiction, regardless of whether or not they vote on the matter.

The public’s concern is also reflected in several sections of the “Open Government Law”; a major segment of that act (RCW 42.17.240) is devoted to requiring candidates and public officials to make financial disclosures at various times so that the public can be informed about potential conflicts.

► Code of Ethics in Ch. 42.23 RCW

Effective January 1, 1995, the state legislature added a specific code of ethics section for county and city officials to the state statutes. This was codified in RCW 42.23.070. The provisions of this statute actually existed previously in a chapter that applied to both state and local officials (Ch. 42.22 RCW, which was repealed effective January 1, 1995), so the provisions are not really new.

Basically, this code of ethics has four provisions, as follows:

1. No municipal officer may use his or her position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself, herself or others;
2. No municipal officer may, directly or indirectly, give or receive any compensation, gift, gratuity, or reward from any source, except the employing municipality, for a matter connected with or related to the officer’s services unless otherwise provided by law;
3. No municipal officer may accept employment or engage in business that the officer might reasonably expect would require him or her to disclose confidential information acquired by reason of his or her official position;
4. No municipal officer may disclose confidential information gained by reason of the officer’s position, nor may the officer use such information for his or her personal gain.

This last provision is particularly significant because it potentially applies to disclosure of information learned by reason of attendance at an executive session. Clearly, executive sessions are meant to be confidential, but the Open Public Meetings Act does not address this issue. Arguably, RCW 42.23.070(4) is applicable to information received in an executive session. See the section of this booklet on Open Public Meetings for more information on executive sessions.

Several specific questions present themselves in view of the provisions of RCW 42.23.070, including the following:

Question: Does the statute prohibit a city or county official from accepting gifts of minimal intrinsic value from someone who does or may seek to do business with his or her office?

Answer: Many officials, either because of the broad language of that statute or on principle, refuse to accept even a business lunch under those circumstances. Others regard items of only token or trivial value to be “de minimis”;⁴ i.e., of insufficient amount to cause legal concern.

In any case, prudence is always advisable to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Also, because the words “token” and “trivial” may have varying interpretations, a city or county legislative body may wish to provide specific guidance on that subject in a supplementary local code of ethics.

Question: May a city or county official accept a valuable gift from a foreign dignitary in connection with a visit?

Answer: A common policy is to allow the acceptance of such a gift on behalf of the city or county, but not for personal use. Arguably, under the wording of RCW 42.23.070(2), a city or county may adopt a formal policy by local “law” governing such occasions, allowing exceptions in appropriate cases involving essentially personal items, subject to disclosure and other procedures to guard against abuse.

Question: May a city or county official permit an individual or company to pay his or her expenses for travel to view a site or plant in connection with business related to the official’s office?

Answer: The statute can be construed to prevent an official from being “compensated” in that manner. On the other hand, payment of expenses for a business trip arguably does not constitute compensation. Prudence suggests that if the trip is determined to be meritorious (and assuming that there is no potential violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine, described in a later chapter), the city or county itself should pay the expenses and any payment or reimbursement from a private source should be made to the city or county.

► The Statutory Prohibition Against Private Interests In Public Contracts (ch. 42.23 RCW)

In General

The principal statutes directly governing the private interests of municipal officers in public contracts are contained in ch. 42.23 RCW, which is entitled “Code of Ethics for Municipal Officers - Contract Interests.” RCW 42.23.030 sets out the general prohibition that:

⁴From the legal phrase “de minimis non curat lex” (the law does not concern itself with trifles).

No municipal officer shall be beneficially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract which may be made by, through, or under the supervision of such officer, in whole or in part, or which may be made for the benefit of his office, or accept, directly or indirectly, any compensation, gratuity or reward in connection with such contract from any other person beneficially interested therein

General Application and Definitions

1. The act applies to all municipal and quasi-municipal corporations, including cities, towns, counties, special districts, and others. As to a charter city or county, however, charter provisions are permitted to control in case of conflict, *if* the charter provisions are more stringent. The standards contained in the act are considered to be minimum ones. RCW 42.23.060.
2. Although the act refers to “officers,” rather than employees, the word “officers” is broadly defined to include deputies and assistant officers, such as a deputy or assistant clerk, and any others who undertake to perform the duties of an officer.
3. The word “contract” includes employment, sales, purchases, leases, and other financial transactions of a contractual nature. (There are some monetary and other exceptions and qualified exceptions, which will be described in later paragraphs.)
4. The phrase “contracting party” includes any person or firm employed by or doing business with a municipality.

Interpretation

1. The beneficial interests in contracts prohibited by RCW 42.23.030 are financial interests only. *Barry v. Johns*, 82 Wn. App. 865, 868, 920 P.2d 222 (1996).
2. The statutory language of RCW 42.23.030, unlike earlier laws, does not prohibit an officer from being interested in *any and all* contracts with the municipality. However, it does apply to those contracts which are even partially subject to his or her control or supervision (whether actually exercised or not) and to contracts made for the benefit of his or her particular office. In other words, assuming that the clerk or treasurer of a particular city has been given no power of supervision or control over that city’s contracts, he or she would be prohibited from having an interest only in contracts affecting his or her own office, such as the purchasing of supplies or services for that office’s operation. Members of a council, commission, or other governing body are more broadly and directly affected, because the municipality’s contracts are made, as a general rule, by or under the supervision of that body, in whole or in part. It does not matter whether or not the member of the governing body voted on the contract in which he or she had a financial interest; the prohibition still applies. *City of Raymond v. Runyon*, 93 Wn. App. 127, 137, 967 P.2d 19 (1998). The employment and other contracting powers of executive officials such as city managers, mayors, and county elected officials also are generally covered by the broad provisions of the act.

3. Subject to certain “remote interest” exceptions, explained later in this section, a member of a governing body who has a forbidden interest may not escape liability simply by abstaining or taking no part in the governing body’s action in making or approving the contract. Nor does it matter that the contract was let through the use of competitive bidding. *See* AGO 53-55 No. 317.
4. Both direct and indirect financial interests are prohibited, and the law also prohibits an officer from receiving financial benefits from anyone else having a contract with the municipality, if the benefits are in any way connected with the contract. For instance, in an early case involving a similar statute, where a mayor had subcontracted with a prospective prime contractor to provide certain materials, the state supreme court struck down the entire contract with the following eloquent expression of its disapproval:

Long experience has taught lawmakers and courts the innumerable and insidious evasions of this salutary principle that can be made, and therefore the statute denounces such a contract if a city officer shall be interested not only directly, but indirectly. However devious and winding the chain may be which connects the officer with the forbidden contract, if it can be followed and the connection made, the contract is void.

Northport v. Northport Townsite Co., 27 Wash. 543, 549, 68 Pac. 204 (1902).

5. The statute ordinarily prohibits a public officer from hiring his or her spouse as an employee because of the financial interest each spouse possesses in the other’s earnings under Washington community property law. However, a bona fide separate property agreement between the spouses may eliminate such a prohibited conflict if the proper legal requirements for maintaining a separate property agreement are followed. *State v. Miller*, 32 Wn.2d 149, 157-58, 201 P.2d 136 (1948). Because of a similar financial relationship, a contract with a minor child or other dependent of the officer may be prohibited. However, chapter 42.23 RCW is not an anti-nepotism law and, absent such a direct or indirect *financial* interest, does not prohibit employing or contracting with an official’s relatives. A mere emotional or sentimental interest is not the type of interest prohibited by that chapter. *Mumma v. Brewster*, 174 Wash. 112, 116, 24 P.2d 438 (1933).

As indicated in earlier paragraphs, individual cities and counties commonly adopt supplementary codes of ethics.

A question often arises when the spouse of a city or county employee or contractor is elected or appointed to an office of that city or county that has authority over the spouse’s employment or other contract:

Question: Must the existing employment or contract be terminated immediately?

Answer: The answer to the question is, ordinarily, “no”; however, any subsequent renewal or modification of the employment or other contract probably would be prohibited. For example, in a letter opinion by the attorney general to the state auditor, the question involved the marriage of a county commissioner to the secretary of another official of the same county.

If the employment had occurred after the marriage, the statute would have applied because of the community property interest of each spouse in the other's earnings. The author concluded that the statute was not violated in that instance because the contract (employment) pre-existed and could not have been made "by, through, or under the supervision of" the county commissioner or for the benefit of his office. However, the letter warned, the problem would arise when the contract first came up for renewal or amendment. That might be deemed to occur, for instance, when the municipality adopts its next budget. Or, in a case where the spouse is an employee who serves "at the pleasure of" the official in question, the employment might be regarded as renewable at the beginning of the next monthly or other pay period after the official takes office. Attorney General's letter to the State Auditor, dated June 8, 1970.

Exceptions

RCW 42.23.030 exempts certain types of contracts from the provisions of the Act, such as:

1. The furnishing of electrical, water, or other utility services by a municipality to its officials, at the same rate and on the same terms as are available to the public generally.
2. The designation of public depositories for municipal funds. Conversely, this does not permit an official to be a director or officer of a financial institution which contracts with the city or county for more than mere "depository" services.
3. The publication of legal notices required by law to be published by a municipality, upon competitive bidding or at rates not higher than prescribed by law for members of the general public.
4. Except in cities with a population of over 1,500 and in counties with a population of 125,000 or more, the employment of any person for unskilled day labor at wages not exceeding \$200 in any calendar month.
5. Other contracts in cities with a population of less than 10,000 and in counties with a population of less than 125,000, *except sales or leases by the municipality as seller or lessor*,⁵ provided:

That the total amount received under the contract or contracts by the municipal officer or the municipal officer's business does not exceed \$1,500 in any calendar month.

However, in a second class city, town, or a noncharter code city, the amount received by the officer or the officer's business contracts may exceed \$1,500 in any calendar month but must not exceed \$18,000 in any calendar year. This exemption is allowed with the following condition:

⁵The statute allows no exception, based on value or otherwise, for a sale or lease by the city or county to an official under whom the contract would be made or supervised.

A municipal officer may not vote in the authorization, approval, or ratification of a contract in which he or she is beneficially interested even though one of the exemptions allowing the awarding of such a contract applies. The interest of the municipal officer must be disclosed to the governing body of the municipality and noted in the official minutes or similar records of the municipality before the formation of the contract.

It is important to note that the language of this section is so structured that the statute cannot be evaded by making a contract or contracts for larger amounts than permitted in a particular period and then spreading the payments over future periods.

Qualified Exceptions – “Remote Interests”

RCW 42.23.040 permits a municipal officer to have certain limited interests in municipal contracts, under certain circumstances. Those types of interest are as follows:

1. The interest of a nonsalaried officer of a nonprofit corporation.
2. The interest of an employee or agent of a contracting party where the compensation of such employee or agent consists entirely of fixed wages or salaries (i.e., without commissions or bonuses). For example, a councilmember may be employed by a contractor with whom the city does business for more than the amounts allowed under RCW 42.23.030(6) (if they apply), but not if any part of his or her compensation includes a commission or year-end bonus.
3. That of a landlord or tenant of a contracting party; e.g., a county commissioner who rents an apartment from a contractor who bids on a county contract.
4. That of a holder of less than one percent of the shares of a corporation or cooperative which is a contracting party.

The conditions for the exemption in those cases of “remote interest” are as follows:

1. The officer must fully disclose the nature and extent of the interest, and it must be noted in the official minutes or similar records before the contract is made.
2. The contract must be authorized, approved, or ratified after that disclosure and recording.
3. The authorization, approval, or ratification must be made in good faith.
4. Where the votes of a certain number of councilmembers or commissioners are required to transact business, that number must be met without counting the vote of the member who has a remote interest.
5. The officer having the remote interest must not influence or attempt to influence any other officer to enter into the contract.

It is accordingly recommended that the officer with a remote interest should not participate, or even appear to participate, in any manner in the governing body's action on the contract.

Penalties – RCW 42.23.050

1. A public officer who violates chapter 42.23 RCW may be held liable for a \$500 civil penalty “in addition to such other civil or criminal liability or penalty as may otherwise be imposed.”
2. The contract is void, and the city or county may avoid payment under the contract, even though it may have been fully performed by another party.
3. The officer may have to forfeit his or her office.

Dual Office-Holding

► In General

The election or appointment of a person to public office, unlike “public employment,” is not considered to be a “contract” within the meaning of chapter 42.23 RCW and similar statutes. 3 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 12.29 (3rd ed. 1990); see also *Powerhouse Engineers v. State*, 89 Wn.2d 177, 184, 570 P.2d 1042 (1977). Under case law, however, it is unlawful for a public officer to appoint himself or herself to another public office unless clearly authorized by statute to do so. See 3 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 12.75 (3rd ed. 1990).⁶ There are also statutory provisions and case law governing the holding of multiple offices by the same person. To apply those general principles it is necessary to know the distinction between a public “office” and “employment.” See, for a detailed analysis, 3 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 12.30 (3rd ed. 1990). In *State ex rel. Brown v. Blew*, 20 Wn.2d 47, 51, 145 P.2d 554 (1944), the Washington State Supreme Court, quoting from another source, held the following five elements to be indispensable in order to make a public employment a “public office”:

1. It must be created by the constitution or by the legislature or created by a municipality or other body through authority conferred by the legislature;
2. It must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the public;
3. The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined, directly or impliedly, by the legislature or through legislative authority;

⁶As an exception to this general rule, however, a councilmember may vote for himself or herself for appointment to a position, such as mayor pro tem, which must be filled from the membership of the council. See *Gayder v. Spiotta*, 206 N. J. Super. 556, 503 A.2d 348, 351-52 (1985).

4. The duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior power, other than the law, unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the legislature and by it placed under the general control of a superior officer or body; and
5. It must have some permanency and continuity and not be only temporary or occasional.

As the cases also point out, usually a public officer is required to execute and file an official oath and bond.

■ Statutory Provisions

There is no single statutory provision governing dual office-holding. In fact, statutory law is usually silent on that question except where the legislature has deemed it best either to prohibit or permit particular offices to be held by the same person regardless of whether they may or may not be compatible under common law principles. For example, see RCW 35.23.142, 35A.12.020, and 35.27.180, which expressly permit the offices of clerk and treasurer to be combined in certain cases. On the other hand, RCW 35A.12.030 and 35A.13.020 prohibit a mayor or councilmember in a code city from holding any other public office or employment within the city's government "except as permitted under the provisions of chapter 42.23 RCW." Also, RCW 36.22.110 prohibits the county auditor from performing the duties of any other county officer.

A statute expressly permits city councilmembers to hold the position of volunteer fire fighter (but not chief or other officer) or reserve law enforcement officer, but only if authorized by a resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote of the full city council. RCW 35.21.770 and RCW 35A.11.110; *see also* AGO 1973 No. 24, and a subsequent letter opinion from the attorney general to the Municipal Research Council, dated March 5, 1986.

In addition, RCW 35A.13.060 expressly authorizes a city manager to serve two or more cities in that capacity at the same time, but it also provides that a city council may require the city manager to devote his or her full time to the affairs of that code city.

■ The Judicial Doctrine of Incompatible Offices

In the absence of a statute on the subject, the same person may hold two or more public offices unless those offices are incompatible. A particular body of judicial decisions (case law "doctrine") prohibits an individual from simultaneously holding two offices that are "incompatible."

Although the Washington State Supreme Court has never had the occasion to apply the doctrine in a situation actually involving two "offices," the court in one case cited the doctrine approvingly and applied it in a different context. *Kennett v. Levine*, 50 Wn.2d 212, 310 P.2d 244 (1957). As the court explained in its opinion:

Offices are incompatible when the nature and duties of the offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both.

The question . . . is . . . whether the functions of the two are inherently inconsistent or repugnant, or whether the occupancy of both offices is detrimental to the public interest.

(Citations omitted.) *Kennett v. Levine, supra*, at 216-217.

Other authorities point out that the question is not simply whether there is a physical impossibility of discharging the duties of both offices at the same time, but whether or not the functions of the two offices are inconsistent, as where one is subordinate to the other, or where a contrariety and antagonism would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of both. Incompatibility may arise where the holder cannot *in every instance* discharge the duties of both offices. 3 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 12.67 (3rd ed. 1990).

Applying those tests, the Washington State Attorney General's Office has found various offices to be incompatible with each other, such as mayor and county commissioner (AGO 57-58 No. 91), county engineer and city engineer (letter to the Prosecuting Attorney of Douglas County, July 16, 1938), and others. Courts in other jurisdictions have held incompatible the positions of mayor and councilmember, mayor and city manager, city marshal and councilmember, to mention only a few. 3 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 12.67(a) (3rd ed. 1990).

The “Appearance of Fairness Doctrine” in Hearings

Until 1969, Washington law dealing with conflicts of interest generally applied only to financial interests, as opposed to emotional, sentimental, or other biases. The “appearance of fairness doctrine,” however, which governs the conduct of certain hearings, covers broader ground. That doctrine was first applied in this state in 1969. In two cases decided in that year, the Washington State Supreme Court indicated a concern that, when boards of county commissioners, city councils, planning commissions, civil service commissions, and similar bodies are required to hold hearings that affect individual or property rights (“quasi-judicial” proceedings), they should be governed by the same strict fairness rules that apply to cases in court. See *Smith v. Skagit County*, 75 Wn.2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969); *State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler*, 76 Wn.2d 213, 456 P.2d 322 (1969). Basically, the rule requires that for justice to be done in such cases, the hearings must not only *be* fair, they must also be free from even the appearance of unfairness. The cases usually involve zoning matters, but the doctrine has been applied to civil service and other hearings as well.

For additional information on this doctrine, see the MRSC publication entitled “The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine in Washington State,” Report No. 32, January 1995. Also, there is a listing of appellate court decisions showing the history of the appearance of fairness doctrine in Appendix A. As the listing also indicates, the appearance of fairness doctrine has been used to invalidate proceedings for a variety of reasons; for example, if a member of the hearing tribunal has a personal interest of *any* kind in the matter or takes evidence improperly outside the hearing (*ex parte*). In those cases, that member is required to completely disassociate himself or herself from the case, or the entire proceeding can be overturned in court.

In 1982, the legislature reacted to the proliferation of appearance of fairness cases involving land use hearings by enacting what is now chapter 42.36 RCW. This RCW chapter defines and codifies the appearance of fairness doctrine, insofar as it applies to local land use decisions.⁷ In substance, those statutes now provide that in land use hearings:

1. The appearance of fairness doctrine applies only to “quasi-judicial” actions of local decision-making bodies. “Quasi-judicial” actions are defined as:

actions of the legislative body, planning commission, hearing examiner, zoning adjuster, board of adjustment, or boards which determine the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties in a hearing or other contested case proceeding.

RCW 42.36.010.

2. The doctrine does not apply to local “legislative actions”


adopting, amending, or revising comprehensive, community, or neighborhood plans or other land use planning documents or the adoption of area-wide zoning ordinances or the adoption of a zoning amendment that is of area-wide significance.

RCW 42.36.010.

3. Candidates for public office may express their opinions about pending or proposed quasi-judicial actions while campaigning (but see paragraph 9 below), without being disqualified from participating in deciding those matters if they are later elected;
4. Acceptance of campaign contributions by candidates who comply with the public disclosure and ethics laws will not later be a violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine. *Snohomish County Improvement Alliance v. Snohomish County*, 61 Wn. App. 64, 73-74, 808 P.2d 781 (1991) (but see paragraph 9 below);
5. During the pendency of any quasi-judicial proceeding, no member of a decision-making body may engage in ex parte (outside the hearing) communications with proponents or opponents about a proposal involved in the pending proceeding, unless that member:
 - a. Places on the record the substance of such oral or written communications; and
 - b. Provides that a public announcement of the content of the communication and of the parties’ rights to rebut the substance of the communication shall be made at each hearing where action is taken or considered on that subject. This does not prohibit correspondence between a citizen and his or her elected official if the correspondence is made a part of the record (when it pertains to the subject matter of a quasi-judicial proceeding).

⁷However, in *Bunko v. Puyallup*, 95 Wn. App. 495, __ P.2d __ (1999), the state court of appeals applied the statutory doctrine to the proceedings of a civil service commission.

6. Participation by a member of a decision-making body in earlier proceedings that result in an advisory recommendation to a decision-making body does not disqualify that person from participating in any subsequent quasi-judicial proceedings (but see paragraph 9 below);
7. Anyone seeking to disqualify a member of a decision-making body from participating in a decision on the basis of a violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine must raise the challenge as soon as the basis for disqualification is made known or reasonably should have been known prior to the issuance of the decision; upon failing to do so, the doctrine may not be relied on to invalidate the decision;
8. A challenged official may participate and vote in proceedings if his or her absence would cause a lack of a quorum, or would result in failure to obtain a majority vote as required by law, provided a challenged official publicly discloses the basis for disqualification prior to rendering a decision; and
9. The appearance of fairness doctrine can be used to challenge land use decisions where a violation of an individual's right to a fair hearing is demonstrated. For instance, certain conduct otherwise permitted by these statutes may be challenged if it would actually result in an unfair hearing (e.g., where campaign statements reflect an attitude or bias that continues after a candidate's election and into the hearing process). RCW 42.36.110. Unfair hearings may also violate the constitutional "due process of law" rights of individuals. *State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler*, 76 Wn.2d 313, 321-22, 456 P.2d 322 (1969) (cited in Appendix A). Questions of this nature may still have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.



Prohibited Uses of Public Funds, Property, or Credit

Constitutional Prohibitions

► In General

Article 7, section 1 (Amendment 14) of the Washington State Constitution requires that taxes and other public funds be spent only for public purposes. *See also State ex rel. Collier v. Yelle*, 9 Wn.2d 317, 324-26, 115 P.2d 373 (1941); AGO 1988 No. 21.

Article 11, section 15 further provides as follows:

The making of profit out of county, city, town, or other public money, or using the same for any purpose not authorized by law, by any officer having the possession or control thereof, shall be a felony, and shall be prosecuted and punished as prescribed by law.

Suits or prosecutions involving violations of that policy are ordinarily brought under specific civil or criminal statutes.

► Prohibition Against Gifts/Lending of Credit

On the other hand, article 8, section 7 of the state constitution has been the direct basis of several lawsuits against local governmental entities. That provision is as follows:

No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.

A city or county is often asked to use its funds, property, or borrowing power (credit) to subsidize or assist endeavors by individuals or private organizations, such as the construction or operation of recreational facilities, economic development, or tourist promotion, and other civic or charitable works. However, the Washington State Supreme Court has long held that no matter how public the purpose may be, it may not be accomplished by public gifts or loans to private persons or organizations (except certain aid to the poor or infirm).⁸ *Johns v. Wadsworth*, 80 Wash. 352, 354-55, 141 Pac. 892 (1914) (the legislature may not authorize the use of public funds to aid a private fair); *Lassila v. Wenatchee*, 89 Wn.2d 804, 812-13, 576 P.2d 54 (1978) (a city may not buy a building for resale to a private movie theater operator).

In recent years, by constitutional amendment or judicial decision, municipalities have been authorized to engage in several programs that previously were held or thought to be unconstitutional under article 8, section 7. For example, by several elections in 1979, 1988, and 1989, the electorate approved and added section 10 to article 8 of the Washington Constitution, permitting counties, cities, towns, and similar operators of municipal electric and water utilities, as authorized by the legislature, to use their operating revenues from the sale of energy or water to assist homeowners in financing conservation measures on a charge-back basis. In 1981, the people adopted a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to permit the state, counties, cities, towns, and port districts, and public corporations established thereby, to issue non-recourse revenue obligations (not funded or secured by taxes or state or municipal credit) to finance industrial development projects. Wash. Const. art. 32, § 1.

Other programs utilizing non-recourse revenue bond funding may be authorized by the legislature without violating the constitution. However, municipal corporations (including “home rule” cities and counties) may need such express statutory authorization to do so (see attorney general’s advisory memorandum to the state auditor dated March 10, 1989).

Our supreme court also has found certain economic development to be a public purpose. *See Anderson v. O’Brien*, 84 Wn.2d 64, 70, 524 P.2d 379 (1974). Accordingly, our state legislature has declared certain economic development programs to be a “public purpose.” *See* ch. 43.160 RCW. However, as the cited cases indicate, the characterization of a program as a “public purpose” may not justify a gift or loan of credit to a private entity for that purpose, except in aid of the poor or infirm.

As a measure of “aid to the poor” the legislature has authorized cities and counties to assist in low income housing by loans or grants to owners or developers of such housing. *See* RCW 35.21.685;

⁸Although the language in the constitution reads “poor *and* infirm” (emphasis added), the courts have held that this should be interpreted in the disjunctive (“poor *or* infirm”). *Health Care Facilities v. Ray*, 93 Wn.2d 108, 115-16, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980).

RCW 36.32.415; *see also* RCW 84.38.070 (all municipal corporations to provide their utility services at reduced rates for low income senior citizens). In *Tacoma v. Taxpayers*, 108 Wn.2d 679, 743 P.2d 793 (1987), the Washington State Supreme Court also upheld, on statutory grounds, a Tacoma ordinance authorizing Tacoma's electric utility to finance energy conservation measures in private buildings. The ordinance was also held constitutional even though it did not fall within the authorization of article 8, section 10, discussed earlier. The court accepted the cities' arguments (several cities joined as intervenors in the case) that the installation of conservation measures involved a repurchase of electric energy by the city and was not an unconstitutional gift to the private owner. *Tacoma v. Taxpayers*, 108 Wn.2d at 703-05.

Often in cases where a loan or grant to a private organization for a public purpose may be prohibited, the public purpose for which county's or city's aid is requested can be legally accomplished, if the county or city desires, by means of an appropriate contract by which the private organization provides the services in question as an agent or contractor for the county or city. For instance, a city, having authority to provide recreational programs for its residents, may do so by contracting with a youth agency or senior citizens' organization to operate recreational programs for those groups, under appropriate city supervision. The contract should be carefully drawn, however, so that the program or project remains the city's own operation and is not an unlawfully broad delegation of city authority, or grant of city funds, to a private agency. Payments should be made pursuant to vouchers reflecting the satisfactory performance of services, as provided in chapter 42.24 RCW.

Statutory Prohibition – Using Public Office Facilities for Political Purposes

There is a special statutory provision, somewhat similar to the constitutional prohibitions just discussed, which forbids the use of public facilities for certain political purposes. RCW 42.17.130, a section of the open government law, provides as follows:

No elective official nor any employee of his office nor any person appointed to or employed by any public office or agency may use or authorize the use of the facilities of a public office or agency, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of assisting a campaign for election of any person to any office or for the promotion of or opposition to any ballot proposition.⁹ Facilities of public office or agency include, but are not limited to, use of stationery, postage, machines, and equipment, use of employees of the office or agency during working hours, vehicles, office space, publications of the office or agency, and clientele lists of persons served by the office or agency: Provided, That the foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply to the following activities:

- (1) Action taken at an open public meeting by members of an elected legislative body to express a collective decision or to actually vote upon a motion, proposal,


⁹The facilities of a public office may be made available on a non-discriminatory, equal access basis, for political uses. WAC 390-05-271(2)(a).

resolution, order, or ordinance, or to support or oppose a ballot proposition so long as (a) any required notice of the meeting includes the title and number of the ballot proposition, and (b) members of the legislative body or members of the public are afforded an approximately equal opportunity for the expression of an opposing view;

- (2) A statement by an elective official in support of or in opposition to any ballot proposition at an open press conference or in response to a specific inquiry;¹⁰
- (3) Activities which are a part of the normal and regular conduct of the office or agency.¹¹

¹⁰A city or county may, however, make “an objective and fair presentation of facts relevant to a ballot proposition,” if such an action is part of the normal and regular conduct of the agency. WAC 390-05-271(2)(b).

¹¹The term “normal and regular conduct” is defined by regulation. *See* WAC 390-05-273.



Competitive Bidding Requirements

Procedural requirements for municipal purchasing and public works projects are extensive and varied; consequently they are treated separately and in depth in other publications. *See, e.g., The New Bidding Book for Washington Cities and Towns*, Municipal Research & Services Center, Report No. 35 (September 1996); *see also Bidding and Award Procedures and Sample Contract Documents*, Municipal Research & Services Center, Information Bulletin No. 456 (October 1989). The following discussion is to acquaint readers generally with those requirements and the penalties for intentionally not following them.

In General

Even when it is not legally required, the submission of municipal purchases and contracts to competitive bidding is generally favored in order to secure the best bargain for the public and to discourage favoritism, collusion, and fraud. *Edwards v. Renton*, 67 Wn.2d 598, 602, 409 P.2d 153 (1965). Accordingly, requirements in statutes, charter provisions, and ordinances to that effect are liberally construed in favor of bidding, and exceptions are narrowly construed. *See Gostovich v. West Richland*, 75 Wn.2d 583, 587, 452 P.2d 737 (1969).


In this state, most major purchases and public works projects by cities and counties *are* subject to statutory competitive bidding requirements. *See, e.g.,* as to purchases and public works by second class cities and towns, and code cities of less than 20,000 population, RCW 35.23.352 and RCW 35A.40.210; as to purchases and public works by counties, *see* RCW 36.32.235-.270. A county's or a city's charter or ordinances may provide additional bidding requirements.

In cases where competitive bidding is not required, the law still may necessitate notice or other less stringent procedures. See, e.g., chapter 39.04 RCW and also, in connection with the procurement of architectural and engineering services, chapter 39.80 RCW.

Penalties for Violations of Competitive Bid Law

RCW 39.30.020 provides as follows:

In addition to any other remedies or penalties contained in any law, municipal charter, ordinance, resolution or other enactment, any municipal officer by or through or under whose supervision, in whole or in part, any contract is made in wilful and intentional violation of any law, municipal charter, ordinance, resolution or other enactment requiring competitive bidding upon such contract shall be held liable to a *civil penalty of not less than \$300* and may be held liable, jointly and severally with any other such municipal officer, for *all consequential damages* to the municipal corporation. If, as a result of criminal action, the violation is found to have been intentional, the municipal officer shall *immediately forfeit his office*. For purposes of this section, “municipal officer” shall mean an “officer” or “municipal officer” as those terms are defined in RCW 42.23.020(2). (Emphasis supplied.)



The Open Public Meetings Act

In General

Before 1971, this state had an “open meetings” law which was then codified as chapter 42.32 RCW. It was ineffective, however, because it required only the “final” action of the council or other body to be taken in public (such as the final vote on an ordinance, resolution, motion, or contract). The Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (now chapter 42.30 RCW) made very significant changes. Most importantly, it requires that *all* meetings of state and municipal governing bodies be open and public, with the exception of courts and the legislature.

Furthermore, a “meeting” generally includes any situation in which a majority (a quorum) of the council, board of commissioners, or other “governing body” (including certain kinds of committees) meets and discusses the business of that body. Social gatherings are expressly excepted, unless the body’s business is discussed at the gatherings. What follows is a outline of the 1971 Act, chapter 42.30 RCW. For a more detailed treatment of the Open Public Meetings Act, see the MRSC publication, *The Open Public Meetings Act – How it Applies to Washington Cities, Towns, and Counties*, Report No. 39 (September 1997).¹²

¹²See also AGO 1971 No. 33, in which the state attorney general answered numerous questions posed by legislators immediately after the Act was passed.

The Purpose of the Open Public Meetings Act, Ch.42.30 RCW

The declared purpose of the Act is to make all meetings of the governing bodies of public agencies, even informal sessions, open and accessible to the public, with only minor specific exceptions.

1. The legislature intends that public agencies' actions and deliberations be conducted openly. RCW 42.30.010.
2. Meetings must be open and public; all persons must be allowed to attend unless otherwise provided by law. RCW 42.30.030.
3. Ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations, orders, and directives must be adopted at public meetings; otherwise they are invalid. RCW 42.30.060.¹³
4. A vote by secret ballot at any meeting that is required to be open is also declared null and void. RCW 42.30.060(2).

The act must be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose. RCW 42.30.910.

Applications

The Act applies to all meetings of, among others:

1. All multi-member governing bodies of state and local agencies, and their subagencies. RCW 42.30.020.
 - a. "Subagency" means a board, commission, or similar entity created by or pursuant to state or local legislation, including planning commissions and others. RCW 42.30.020(1)(c).¹⁴

¹³*Slaughter v. Fire District No. 20*, 50 Wn. App. 733, 738, 750 P.2d 656 (1988), *rev. denied*, 113 Wn.2d 1014 (1989). The court of appeals, in a later case, also held invalid a labor agreement that had been negotiated at meetings that violated the Act. *Mason County v. PERC*, 54 Wn. App. 36, 40-41, 771 P.2d 1185 (1989). In apparent reaction to that case, however, section 1, chapter 98, Laws of 1990 (RCW 42.30.140(4)) broadened the Act's exemptions to include all collective bargaining sessions and related meetings and discussions with employee organizations.

¹⁴The term "subagency" does not include a purely advisory body unless it is legally required that its recommendations be considered by the parent body. AGO 1971 No. 33.

- b. “Governing body” includes a committee of a council or other governing body “when the committee acts on behalf of the governing body, conducts hearings, or takes testimony or public comment.” RCW 42.30.020.¹⁵
- c. Certain policy groups representing participants who have contracted for the output of an operating agency’s (WPPSS’) generating plant. RCW 42.30.020(1)(d).

The Act does not apply to:

- 1. Courts or the state legislature. RCW 42.30.020(1)(a).
- 2. Proceedings expressly excluded by RCW 42.30.140, namely:
 - a. Certain licensing and disciplinary proceedings.
 - b. Certain quasi-judicial proceedings that affect only individual rights; e.g., a civil service hearing affecting only the rights of an individual employee, and not the general public.
 - c. Collective bargaining sessions with employee organizations, including contract negotiations, grievance meetings, and discussions relating to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement; also, that portion of a meeting held during labor or professional negotiations, or grievance or mediation proceedings, to formulate strategy or to consider proposals submitted.
 - d. Generally, matters governed by the State Administrative Procedure Act (ch. 34.05 RCW).
- 3. Social gatherings, if no “action” (as defined in RCW 42.30.020(3)) is taken. RCW 42.30.070. Note, however, the ensuing explanation of “action.”

Key Definitions

“**Meeting**” means meetings at which “**action**” is taken. RCW 42.30.020(4).

“**Action**” means all transacting of a governing body’s business, including receipt of public testimony, deliberations, discussions, considerations, reviews, and evaluations, as well as “final” action. RCW 42.30.010; 42.30.020(3).

¹⁵A committee “acts on behalf of the governing body” only when it exercises delegated authority, such as fact finding. AGO 1986 No. 16.

Two Kinds of Meetings

► Regular Meetings – RCW 42.30.060-.075

1. Definition: A recurring meeting held according to a schedule fixed by statute, ordinance, or other appropriate rule.
2. If the designated time falls on a holiday, the regular meeting may be held on the next business day.
3. There is no statutory limitation as to the kind of business that may be transacted at a “regular” (as distinguished from “special”) meeting.

The Open Public Meetings Act itself does not require any special notice of a regular meeting. However, later statutory enactments require municipal governing bodies to establish a procedure for notifying the public of all meeting agendas. RCW 35.27.300; 35.24.220; 35.23.310; 35.22.288; 35A.12.160.¹⁶

► Special Meetings – RCW 42.30.080

1. Definition: Any meeting other than “regular.”
2. May be called by the presiding officer or a majority of the members.
3. Must be announced by written notice to all members of the governing body; also to members of the news media who have filed written requests for such notice. The notice of a special meeting:
 - a. Must specify the time and place of the meeting and the business to be transacted.¹⁷
 - b. Must be delivered personally or by mail 24 hours in advance.
 - c. May be waived by a member.
 - d. Is not necessary in specified emergencies. *See also* RCW 42.30.070.

¹⁶Failure to provide public notice of the preliminary agenda of a city council or board of county commissioners meeting and even of an item which is to be considered at the meeting may, in certain circumstances, invalidate action taken at that meeting. *Port of Edmonds v. Fur Breeders*, 63 Wn. App. 159, 166-67, 816 P.2d 1268 (1991). The notice given must fairly apprise the public of the action to be taken at the meeting.

¹⁷Other business may be discussed but final action may be taken only on matters specified in the notice of the special meeting.

Place of Meetings

1. As far as the Open Public Meetings Act is concerned, a meeting may be held at any place within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the body unless otherwise provided in the law under which the agency was formed. RCW 42.30.070.¹⁸ However, the meeting place should not be selected so as to effectively exclude members of the public. RCW 42.30.030.
2. The place of a special meeting must be designated in the notice. RCW 42.30.080.
3. In certain emergencies requiring expedited action, the meeting or meetings may be held in such place as is designated by the presiding officer and notice requirements are suspended. RCW 42.30.070 and 42.30.080.

Conduct of Meetings

1. All persons must be permitted to attend (RCW 42.30.030) except unruly persons as provided in RCW 42.30.050.
2. Attendance may not be conditioned upon registration or similar requirements. RCW 42.30.040. (The Act does not prohibit a requirement that persons identify themselves prior to testifying at hearings.)
3. In cases of disorderly conduct:
 - a. Disorderly persons may be expelled.
 - b. If expulsion is insufficient to restore order, the meeting place may be cleared and/or relocated.
 - c. Non-offending members of the news media may *not* be excluded.
 - d. If the meeting is relocated, final action may be taken only on agenda items. RCW 42.30.050.

¹⁸Note that the restrictions on holding city and town council meetings within the corporate limits were removed by the state legislature in 1994. However, all final actions on resolutions and ordinances must take place within the corporate limits of the city.

A board of county commissioners or county council must hold its regular meetings at the county seat. RCW 36.32.080. However, it may hold special meetings at some other location in the county “if the agenda item or items are of unique interest or concern to the citizens of the portion of the county in which the special meeting is to be held.” RCW 36.32.090.

4. Adjournments/Continuances (RCW 42.30.090 - .100):

- a. Any meeting (including hearings) may be adjourned or continued to a specified time and place.
- b. Less than a quorum may adjourn.
- c. The clerk or secretary may adjourn a meeting to a stated time and place, if no members are present, thereafter giving the same written notice as required for a special meeting.
- d. A copy of the order or notice must be posted immediately on or near the door where the meeting was being (or would have been) held.
- e. An adjourned regular meeting continues to be a regular meeting for *all* purposes.

Executive Sessions – RCW 42.30.110

- 1. **Definition** (as commonly understood): That portion of a meeting from which the public may be excluded.
- 2. **Permissible When:**¹⁹
 - a. To consider the selection of a site or the acquisition of real estate by lease or purchase when public knowledge regarding such consideration would cause a likelihood of increased price;
 - b. To consider the minimum price at which real estate will be offered for sale or lease when public knowledge regarding such consideration would cause a likelihood of decreased price. However, final action selling or leasing public property must be taken in a meeting open to the public;
 - c. To review negotiations on the performance of publicly bid contracts when public knowledge regarding such consideration would cause a likelihood of increased costs;
 - d. To receive and evaluate complaints or charges brought against a public officer or employee. However, upon the request of such officer or employee, a public hearing or meeting open to the public must be conducted upon such complaint or charge;

¹⁹The listing of matters for which a city or county governing body may meet in executive session includes here only those that such a body would address. There are others identified in the statute (e.g., “matters affecting national security”) not identified here.

- e. To evaluate the qualifications of an applicant for public employment or to review the performance of a public employee.²⁰ However, “[except when certain exempted labor negotiations are involved], discussion by a governing body of salaries, wages, and other conditions of employment to be generally applied within the agency shall occur in a meeting open to the public” Furthermore, the final action of hiring, setting the salary of an individual employee or class of employees, or discharging or disciplining an employee, must also be taken in an open public meeting;
- f. To evaluate the qualifications of a candidate for appointment to elective office. However, any interview of such candidate and final action appointing a candidate to elective office shall be in a meeting open to the public;
- g. To discuss with legal counsel representing the agency matters relating to: agency enforcement actions; or litigation or potential litigation to which the agency, the governing body, or a member acting in an official capacity is, or is likely to become, a party, when public knowledge regarding the discussion is likely to result in an adverse legal or financial consequence to the agency. RCW 42.30.110(1).

3. Conduct of Executive Sessions

- a. An executive (closed) session must be part of a regular or special meeting. RCW 42.30.110.²¹
- b. Before convening an executive session, the presiding officer must publicly announce the purpose for excluding the public and the time when the executive session will conclude. The executive session may be extended by announcement of the presiding officer. RCW 42.30.120(2).
- c. Final adoption of an “ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, order or directive” must be done in the “open” meeting. RCW 42.30.120.

4. Improper Disclosure of Information Learned in Executive Session

- a. It is the clear intent of the provisions relating to executive sessions that information learned in executive session be treated as confidential. However, there is no specific sanction or

²⁰A 1985 amendment (ch. 366, Laws of 1985), together with some contemporaneous circumstances (See AGO 1985 No. 4), raised a question as to whether or not this section continued to allow executive sessions to review applications for appointive public office, or the performance of such appointees, as distinguished from “public employment” or “employees”. However, attorneys for many public agencies, including members of the attorney general’s staff, take the position that the Act continues to allow executive sessions for those purposes. (Memorandum to MRSC’s general counsel from Senior Assistant Attorney General Richard M. Montecucco, dated March 15, 1990.)

²¹There is no prohibition against holding a special meeting solely to consider one or more subjects in executive session, but the subject matter must be identified at least in general terms in the meeting notice; e.g., “to consider a building site,” or “to consider applicants for employment.” RCW 42.30.080.

penalty in the Open Public Meetings Act for disclosure of information learned in executive session.

- b. A more general provision is provided in RCW 42.23.070 prohibiting disclosure of confidential information learned by reason of the official position of a city officer. This general provision would seem to apply to information obtained in executive sessions.


Minutes – RCW 42.32.030²²

1. Minutes of regular and special meetings must be promptly recorded and open to public inspection. (The statute does not specify any particular kind of “recording.”)
2. No minutes are required to be recorded for executive sessions. (However, prudence may suggest that a record of some kind be kept for the protection of the governing body.)
3. Notes and tapes are not “minutes” but are “public records.” See RCW 42.17.020(26), (28). They may be exempt from public disclosure for particular reasons; e.g., notes or tapes of executive sessions may be withheld while the “vital governmental interest” or “personal privacy” reason for the executive session itself continues to exist. RCW 42.17.310.

Violation/Remedies

1. Ordinances, rules, resolutions, regulations, orders, or directives adopted, or secret ballots taken, in violation of the Act are invalid. RCW 42.30.060. Agreements negotiated or adopted in closed meetings held in violation of the act also may be invalid. *Mason County v. PERC*, 54 Wn. App. 36, 40-41, 771 P.2d 1185 (1989). (But see footnote 9, *supra*, regarding collective bargaining and related matters.)
2. A member of a governing body who knowingly participates in violating the Act is subject to a \$100 civil penalty. RCW 42.30.120.
3. Mandamus or injunctive action may be brought to stop or prevent violations. RCW 42.17.130.
4. Any person may sue to recover the penalty or to stop or prevent violations. RCW 42.30.120 - .130.
5. A person prevailing against an agency is entitled to be awarded all costs including reasonable attorneys’ fees. However, if the court finds that the action was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, the court may award to the agency reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees. RCW 42.30.120(2).

²²This section is not a part of chapter 42.30 RCW, but a section preserved from the earlier act.



Open Government, Public Records, Privacy

In General

This multi-faceted subject heading reflects the complex provisions of Initiative 276 (the “Act”), referenced earlier in this bulletin, which the people approved into law in 1972. The Act (now chapter 42.17 RCW) contains several subchapters, seemingly diverse but all properly falling under the category of “openness in government.” *Fritz v. Gorton*, 83 Wn.2d 275, 290, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).

Three of the subchapters deal separately with the subjects of campaign financing, legislative lobbying (including lobbying by municipal and other governmental agencies), and personal financial disclosure by public officials and candidates. The fourth subchapter, modeled after the federal “Freedom of Information Act,” deals with the public’s right to inspect and/or copy public records. The Act also contains administrative provisions, including the establishment of the Public Disclosure Commission as a state agency to administer and enforce the provisions of the Act. Candidates and public officials, as one of the first steps in their election process, become familiar with the commission and the wealth of information and assistance that it provides, including detailed instructions regarding political campaigns and personal financial disclosure requirements of the Act. Similar information as to regulations on municipal lobbying is readily available from the same source. Consequently, we will not attempt to duplicate that information in this publication.

However, the substantive provisions of the Act dealing with public records, RCW 42.17.250 through 42.17.340, are mainly “self enforcing,” and there is relatively little administrative law on that subject. The following brief outline and discussion is intended to supply a basic working knowledge of those “freedom of information” provisions.²³ For a more detailed treatment of the public records disclosure law, see the MRSC publication, *Public Records Disclosure for Washington Cities and Towns*, Report No. 34 (March 1996), which is also applicable to counties.

Purpose of the Public Disclosure Law

1. “[M]indful of the right of individuals to privacy and the desirability of efficient administration of government, full access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured

The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to promote . . . full access to public records so as to insure continuing public confidence . . . and so as to assure that the public interest will be fully protected” RCW 42.17.010(11); *see also* RCW 42.17.920.

2. Conflicting provisions of other laws are superseded. RCW 42.17.920.
3. Absent statutory provisions to the contrary, agencies (this term expressly includes all counties, cities, and towns) may not release or withhold records based upon the identity of the requestor, and must rely solely on statutory exemptions and prohibitions for refusing to disclose public records. RCW 42.17.010 and RCW 42.17.270.

Broad Definition of Public Records

1. “‘Public record’ includes any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics.” RCW 42.17.020(36).
2. “‘Writing’ means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of recording any form of communication or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols or combination thereof, and all papers, maps, magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films and prints, motion picture, film and video recordings, magnetic or punched cards, discs, drums, diskettes, sound recordings, and other documents, including existing data compilations from which information may be obtained or translated.” RCW 42.17.020(42).

²³Although not discussed here, local officials should have some familiarity with the Criminal Records Privacy Act, ch. 10.97 RCW. This Act provides for the dissemination (or withholding) of criminal history record information and for the correction of such information.

Duties of Public Agencies (State and Local)

1. Agencies are required to establish procedures for access to their records. Indexes should be developed and published. RCW 42.17.250 - .260.
2. Records must be made available for public inspection and copying during customary office hours. If an agency does not have regular office hours, they are set by statute. RCW 42.17.280.
3. Agencies must make their facilities available for copying their records, or make copies upon request; they must honor requests by mail. They may charge for the copies, but only a “reasonable charge” representing the amount necessary to reimburse the city or town for the actual costs incident to the copying.

Charges for photocopying must be imposed in accordance with the actual per page cost or other costs established and published by the agency. If the agency has not determined actual per page costs, the agency may not charge in excess of fifteen cents per page. RCW 42.17.300

Also, cities may not charge for staff time in locating records or mere inspections of records. RCW 42.17.270; RCW 42.17.290; RCW 42.17.300; *see also* AGO 1991 No. 6.

What Records May Be Withheld?

1. RCW 42.17.260(7) forbids public agencies from providing lists of individuals “requested for commercial purposes” unless specifically authorized or directed by law. For example, in a 1975 letter opinion, the attorney general concluded that a request by a business promotional organization for a list of individuals’ names to enable that organization to distribute advertising materials had to be denied. AGLO 1975 No. 38.

However, lists of professional licensees and applicants are available to recognized professional associations or educational organizations.

2. There is no general “right of privacy” exemption, aside from specific statutory exemptions from public disclosure. Furthermore, a right of privacy is violated only if disclosure (1) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. RCW 42.17.255. Mere inconvenience or embarrassment is not sufficient in itself to constitute a violation of privacy. *Police Guild v. Liquor Control Board*, 112 Wn.2d 30, 38, 769 P.2d 283 (1989).
3. RCW 42.17.310 grants a qualified exemption from public inspection for certain specific types of records. Some of the more important exemptions from the standpoint of a municipality include the following:

- a. Personal information in files maintained for students in public schools, patients or clients of public institutions or public health agencies, welfare recipients, prisoners, probationers, or parolees.
- b. Personal information in files maintained for employees, appointees, or elected officials of any public agency to the extent that disclosure would violate their right to privacy.²⁴
- c. Certain taxpayer information.
- d. Intelligence and investigative records compiled by investigative, law enforcement, and penology agencies.
- e. Information revealing the identity of persons who are witnesses to or victims of crime or who file complaints with investigative, law enforcement, or penology agencies (other than the Public Disclosure Commission) if disclosure would be a danger to a person's life, safety, or property. If at the time a complaint is filed the complainant, victim or witness indicates a desire for disclosure or nondisclosure, that desire shall govern.
- f. Test questions, scoring keys, and other examination data used to administer a license, employment, or academic examination.
- g. Certain real estate appraisals.
- h. Valuable formulae, designs, drawings, and research data obtained by any agency within five years of the request for disclosure when disclosure would produce private gain and public loss.
- i. Preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, and intra-agency memorandums in which opinions are expressed or policies formulated or recommended except that a specific record is not exempt when publicly cited by an agency in connection with any agency action.
- j. Records that are relevant to a controversy to which the agency is a party but which would not be available to another party under pre-trial court discovery rules.
- k. Records of archeological sites.
- l. Certain library information.

²⁴Whether information is "personal" depends mainly on whether or not the information pertains to the public's business versus the individual's business. AGO 1973 No. 4. In *Tacoma Public Library v. Woessner*, 90 Wn. App. 205, 951 P.2d 357, *rev. denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1030 (1998), the court of appeals explained that the determination on whether this exemption applies focuses on whether the requested file contains personal information that is normally maintained for the benefit of employees, disclosure of which would "violate their right to privacy." For example, records showing salaries, fringe benefits, and numbers of hours worked by named employees are not exempt, but private information such as employee non-public job evaluations, charitable contributions, private addresses, and phone numbers can be withheld to protect privacy. 90 Wn. App. at 218-223.

- m. Financial information required in connection with prequalifying bidders on certain state contracts.
- n. All applications for public employment including names, resumes, and other related information.
- o. Residential addresses, telephone numbers, and mailing lists of employees or volunteers of a public agency.
- p. Residential addresses and telephone numbers of utility customers.

Those exemptions are qualified, however. They generally do not apply to disclosable information that can be separated from nondisclosable information. Furthermore, when the reason for the exemption ceases, the records or files may lose their exemptions. *Hearst v. Hoppe, supra*.

- 4. A law enforcement authority is prohibited from requesting disclosure of records belonging to a municipal utility unless the authority provides a written statement that it suspects the utility customer has committed a crime and the authority has a reasonable belief that the records could determine the truth of the suspicion. RCW 42.17.314.
- 5. Information on concealed pistol licenses is exempt from disclosure except that such information may be released to law enforcement or corrections agencies.
- 6. Medical Records – Public inspection and copying of health care information of patients is covered by chapter 70.02 RCW. That chapter generally provides that a health care provider, a person who assists as a health care provider in the delivery of health care, or an agent or employee of a health care provider may not disclose information about a patient to any other person without the patient’s written authorization. RCW 70.02.020. There are some exceptions to this rule, and, although not discussed here, these provisions may become applicable to cities and counties in some situations. *See* RCW 72.02.050.

Procedures for Access – Remedies

- 1. Agencies are required to make their records available “promptly” on request. They must within five business days of the request either (1) provide the record, (2) acknowledge the request and give an estimate of when the response will be made,²⁵ or (3) deny the request. They must give written reasons for denials of access or copies. There must be procedures for reviewing


²⁵Reasons justifying additional time to respond include time needed to clarify the intent of the request, to locate and assemble information requested, to notify third persons and agencies affected by the request, or to determine whether any of the information is exempt. RCW 42.17.340. A person who believes the estimate of time required to respond is unreasonable may petition the superior court to have the agency justify the response time as reasonable. The burden of proof to show reasonableness is on the agency. RCW 42.17.340(2).

decisions denying requests. If a request is denied, the review of the denial is considered complete at the end of the second business day following the denial. RCW 42.17.320.

Agencies should adopt procedures to protect their records and prevent interference with agency functions. An agency may seek a court order to protect a particular record. RCW 42.17.330.

2. A person whose request for inspection or copying is wrongly denied can sue on his or her own behalf. The court may order the record to be produced. The successful citizen is then entitled to be reimbursed for all costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and *may* be awarded an amount which is not less than \$5 nor more than \$100 per day for each day the request was denied. The burden of proof is generally on the agency to justify its decision on the basis of a specific statutory exemption from disclosure.²⁶

²⁶RCW 42.17.340.



Immunities from Tort Liability

Appointed and elected officials (mayors, councilmembers, commissioners) are immune from civil liability in state law to third parties for making or failing to make a discretionary decision in the course of their official duties. RCW 4.24.470. See also *Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State*, 67 Wn.2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440 (1965). However, be aware that, for other than legislative officials, this immunity is qualified, because damages can be assessed for violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §1983) if their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known. *Sintra v. Seattle*, 119 Wn.2d 1, 25, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).²⁷ The U.S. Supreme Court has held that local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983. *Bogan v. Scott-Harris*, 523 U.S. 44 (1998).

Courts have also recognized certain immunities under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983) such as absolute prosecutorial immunity, e.g., when a city attorney prosecutes a defendant for allegedly violating a city ordinance or when a county prosecutor does so for violation of a state or county law. That absolute immunity is limited, however, to when the criminal prosecutor is performing the traditional functions of an advocate. *Kalina v. Fletcher*, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).


However, the municipal corporation itself may be held liable even though those individual officers may be protected. RCW 4.24.470(1) and 4.96.010(1). See also *Babcock v. State*, 116 Wn.2d 596, 620, 809 P.2d 143 (1991).

²⁷It is not a defense that an official acted in accordance with advice from legal counsel. *Robinson v. Seattle*, 119 Wn.2d 34, 68, 830 P.2d 318 (1992).

Cities and counties, like the state, have the authority to provide liability insurance to protect their officers and employees from loss due to their acts or omissions in the course of their duties. *See* RCW 35.21.205; 35.21.209; 36.16.138.

There is an indemnification provision in state law for good faith actions of officers, employees and volunteers while performing their official duties. RCW 4.96.041. This statute provides that when an action or proceeding for damages is brought against any past or present officer, employee, or volunteer of a city or county, which arises from an act or omission while performing his or her official duties, then such officer, employee, or volunteer may request the city or county to authorize the defense of the action at public expense. If the legislative body finds that the actions or omissions were within the scope of his or her official duties, then the request for payment of defense expenses must be granted. In addition, any monetary judgment against the officer, employee, or volunteer shall also be paid.

Cities and counties should adopt local ordinances or resolutions providing terms and conditions for the defense and indemnification of their official, employees, and volunteers.



Role of the City Attorney and Prosecuting Attorney, and Legal Ethics

City attorneys and county prosecuting attorneys have similar roles as legal advisors to their respective local governments. Also, both legal positions have duties relating to advising city or county officials, prosecuting actions on behalf of their jurisdictions, and defending in actions against their jurisdictions.

Washington State law requires that every city and town in the state have a city or town attorney. In some cities, the attorney will be a full-time, in-house officer of the city. In other cities, the city attorney will maintain a private practice of law but be on retainer to the city to perform the required duties. In either case, the city attorney advises city authorities and officers concerning all legal matters pertaining to the business of the city. The city attorney generally is to represent the city in all actions brought by or against the city or against city officials in their official capacity. Of course, other attorneys may be hired to handle specific cases because of the nature of the case or because the city attorney has a conflict or other reason he or she cannot become involved. The city attorney also is to perform such other duties as the city council may by ordinance direct.

All counties have an elected prosecuting attorney. Unlike the city attorney, the duties of the prosecuting attorney are extensively set out by statute. See RCW 36.27.020. In addition to having the authority to appoint deputies, the county prosecuting attorney has the authority to contract with “special deputy prosecuting attorneys” for limited and identified purposes. RCW 36.27.040. A county legislative authority may also appoint a “special attorney” “to perform any duty which any prosecuting attorney is authorized or required by law to perform,” but only if the appointment is approved by the presiding superior court judge. RCW 36.32.200.

Although there is no specific authority for a city council to hire outside legal counsel separate and apart from the city attorney, the courts have permitted a council to do so in certain circumstances. Normally, the city attorney advises all city officials, including councilmembers, and the city council should not hire separate outside council to receive advice on city affairs. In rare cases, the city attorney may have a conflict and not be in a position to advise both the city council and the mayor. In *State v. Volkmer*, 73 Wn. App. 89, 95 (1994), the court of appeals held:


If extraordinary circumstances exist, such that the mayor and/or town council is incapacitated, or the town attorney refuses to act or is incapable of acting or is disqualified from acting, a court may determine that a contract with outside counsel is both appropriate and necessary.

See also a discussion of this issue in the case of *Tukwila v. Todd*, 17 Wn. App. 401, 406-407, 563 P.2d 223 (1977) and 10 McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, § 29.12, (3rd ed. 1999).

Recognize also that there are situations where the city attorney or county prosecutor will not be in a position to advise all the city officials who are involved in a case or hearing. As an obvious example, if the police chief has been terminated by the city and requests a hearing before the civil service commission, the city attorney cannot ethically advise the city administration, the civil service commission, and the police chief. When analyzing a problem, the legal practitioner should always ask if there is more than one “client” involved (council, mayor, city manager) and whether there is a conflict between these “clients.”²⁷


It is beyond the scope of this publication to review these issues in detail. For more information, see the *Public Law Ethics Primer for Government Lawyers*, Washington State Municipal Attorneys Association (1998), which may be ordered from MRSC. There have been a number of articles written on aspects of this subject that have been presented at meetings of the Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys and the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys in the last several years. A list of these pertinent articles is contained in Appendix C of this publication. These articles review legal ethics, the problem of representing multiple clients in a municipal context, the attorney-client privilege as it relates to the municipal client, and so on. Any of these articles may be obtained from MRSC on request.

²⁷The city attorney’s client is actually the city as an entity. Similarly, the county prosecutor’s client is the county as an entity. In both cases, the public attorney’s relationship to the local government is similar in a number of respects to that of an attorney who represents a corporation. See *Upjohn Co. v. U.S.*, 449 U.S. 383, 66 L.Ed.2d 584, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981) for a model of who is the lawyer’s client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.



Safeguards and Precautions

1. Be knowledgeable. Know the rules, and follow them strictly.
2. Municipal government is uniquely entwined with a vast body of constitutional, statutory, and decisional law. The municipal attorney can and should play a vital role in the understanding and administration of that law.
3. Develop clear, sound policies of protection for the city, its officers, and employees. Obtain adequate liability insurance when available; or explore membership in one of the several available insurance pools.



Conclusion

The purpose of this publication is to help avoid certain trouble areas most frequently encountered by city and county officials. Although it is meant to be comprehensive, it does not necessarily include all statutes and regulations that possibly may apply. Furthermore, as we indicated at the outset, the law frequently changes with new enactments and interpretations, and even legal interpretations may vary depending upon the facts of a particular case. Therefore, it is important to develop a healthy working relationship with the various offices available to you. Do not hesitate to seek information and advice, especially on legal matters. The result may make the difference between success or failure in asserting a claim or defense, particularly when the good faith of the official may be an issue in the lawsuit.

We emphasize, in addition, that the legal and other professional staff of the Municipal Research & Services Center are constantly available to serve city attorneys, county prosecutors, and all other city and county officials in this important work.

We are grateful for the continuing interest of public officials in this publication. We hope that these updated guidelines will continue to be a useful source of information and benefit.

Appendix A

Summary of Washington Appearance of Fairness Doctrine Cases

Summary of Washington Appearance of Fairness Doctrine Cases

Case	Body/Action	Conflict	Decision
<u>Smith v. Skagit County</u> , 75 Wn.2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969)	Planning Commission/Rezone	Planning commission met with proponents and excluded opponents in executive session.	Violation of appearance of fairness doctrine. Amendments to zoning ordinance to create an industrial zone were void - cause remanded to the superior court for entry of such a decree.
<u>State ex. rel. Beam v. Fulwiler</u> , 76 Wn.2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969)	Civil Service Commission/Appeal from discharge of civil service employee (chief examiner of commission)	Challenge to hearing tribunal composed of individuals who investigated, accused, prosecuted, and would judge the controversy involved.	An appellate proceeding before the commission would make the same persons both prosecutor and judge and the tribunal must, therefore, be disqualified. A fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal is elemental to the concepts of fundamental fairness inherent in administrative due process.
<u>Chrobuck v. Snohomish County</u> , 78 Wn.2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971)	Planning Commission - Board of County Commissioners/Comprehensive plan amendment and rezone	Chairman of planning commission and chairman of county commissioners visited Los Angeles with expenses paid by petitioner. Chairman of county commissioners announced favorable inclination prior to hearing. New planning commission member previously testified on behalf of petitioner and signed advertisement to that effect, then participated to some extent at commission hearings but disqualified himself from voting.	Violation of appearance of fairness doctrine. Rezone set aside - land returned to original designation. Planning commission functions as an administrative or quasi-judicial body. Note: Cross-examination may be required if both parties have attorneys.
<u>Buell v. Bremerton</u> , 80 Wn.2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972)	Planning Commission/Rezone	Chairman of planning commission owned property adjoining property to be rezoned. Property could have been indirectly affected in value.	Violation of appearance of fairness doctrine. Overrules <u>Chestnut Hill Co. v. Snohomish County</u> . Action by city council rezoning property on planning commission recommendation improper.
<u>Fleming v. Tacoma</u> , 81 Wn.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972)	City Council/Rezone	Attorney on council employed by the successful proponents of a zoning action two days after decision by city council.	Violation of appearance of fairness doctrine. Rezone ordinance invalid. Overrules <u>Lillians v. Gibbs</u> .
<u>Anderson v. Island County</u> , 81 Wn.2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972)	Board of County Commissioners/Rezone	Chairman of county commission was former owner of applicant's company. Chairman told opponents at public hearing they were wasting their time talking.	Violation of appearance of fairness doctrine. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
<u>Narrowview Preservation Association v. Tacoma</u> , 84 Wn.2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974)	Planning Commission/Rezone	Member of planning commission was a loan officer of bank which held mortgage on property of applicant. Member had no knowledge his employer held the mortgage on the property.	Appearance of fairness doctrine violation; thus zoning ordinance invalid. Court also held, however, acquaintances with persons or casual business dealings insufficient to constitute violation of doctrine.

Case	Body/Action	Conflict	Decision
<u>Byers v. The Board of Clallam County Commissioners</u> , 84 Wn.2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974)	Planning Commission/Adoption of interim zoning ordinance	Members owned property 10-15 miles from area zoned and there was no indication that such property was benefited directly or indirectly by rezone.	No violation of appearance of fairness doctrine. Ordinance held invalid on other grounds.
<u>Local Union 1296 v. Kennewick</u> , 86 Wn.2d 156, 542 P.2d 1252 (1975)	Arbitration Board/Arbitration hearing	Arbitrator had drinks with union representative after oral decision but before written decision. Decision was unchanged.	Court found indiscretion on part of arbitrator but affirmed the arbitrator's decision. By statute appearance of fairness doctrine inapplicable because by statute can use only test of whether decision arbitrary and capricious.
<u>Seattle v. Loutsis Investment Co., Inc.</u> , 16 Wn. App. 158, 554 P.2d 379 (1976)	City/Certiorari to review findings of public use and necessity by court in condemnation action	Alleged illegal copy made of a key to the condemned premises and unauthorized entries by city employees and other arbitrary conduct by city employees violated appearance of fairness doctrine.	Court held appearance of fairness doctrine applies only to hearings and not to administrative actions by municipal employees. Cites <u>Fleming v. Tacoma</u> .
<u>King County Water District No. 54 v. King County Boundary Review Board</u> , 87 Wn.2d 536, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976)	Boundary Review Board/Assumption by city of water district	Alleged ex parte conversations between member of the board and persons associated with Seattle Water District and Water District 75 about the proposed assumption by city of Water District No. 54.	No appearance of fairness violation. Record does not indicate conversations took place (??) and court could not conclude there was any partiality or entangling influences which would affect the board member in making the decision.
<u>Swift, et al. v. Island County, et al.</u> , 87 Wn.2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976)	Board of County Commissioners/Overruling planning commission and approving a preliminary plat	A county commissioner was a stockholder and chairman of the board of a savings and loan association which had a financial interest in a portion of the property being platted.	Violated appearance of fairness doctrine.
<u>Milwaukee R.R. v. Human Rights Commission</u> , 87 Wn.2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976)	State Human Rights Commission Special Hearing Tribunal/Complaint against railroad for alleged discrimination	Member of hearing tribunal had applied for a job with the commission.	The board's determination held invalid because it had appearance of unfairness.
<u>Fleck v. King County</u> , 16 Wn. App. 668, 558 P.2d 254 (1977)	Administrative Appeals Board/permit to install fuel tank	Two members of the board were husband and wife.	Fact that two members of board were husband and wife created appearance of fairness problem.
<u>SAVE (Save a Valuable Environment) v. Bothell</u> , 89 Wn.2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978)	Bothell Planning Commission/Rezone	Planning commission members were executive director and a member of the board of directors, respectively, of the chamber of commerce which actively promoted the rezone.	Violation of appearance of fairness. Trial court found that the proposed shopping center which would be accommodated by the rezone would financially benefit most of the chamber of commerce members and their support was crucial to the success of the application. The planning commission members' associational ties were sufficient to require application of the doctrine.

Case	Body/Action	Conflict	Decision
<u>Polygon v. Seattle</u> , 90 Wn.2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978)	City of Seattle, Superintendent of Buildings/Application for building permit denied	Announced opposition to the project by the mayor, and a statement allegedly made by the superintendent, prior to the denial, that because of the mayor's opposition, he would announce that the permit application would be denied.	The appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply to administrative action, except where a public hearing is required by law. The applicable fairness standard for discretionary administrative action is actual partiality precluding fair consideration.
<u>Hill v. Dept. L & I</u> , 90 Wn.2d 276, 580 P.2d 636 (1978)	Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals/Appeal by industrial insurance claimant	The chairman of the appeals board had been supervisor of industrial insurance at the time the claim had been closed.	No violation of appearance of fairness doctrine. The chairman submitted his uncontroverted affidavit establishing lack of previous participation or knowledge of the case.
<u>City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Board</u> , 90 Wn.2d 856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978)	Boundary Review Board/Approval of annexation proposal	Use of interrogatories on appeal to superior court to prove bias of board members.	Holding that the use of such extra-record evidence was permissible under the specific circumstances present, the majority opinion observed: "Our appearance of fairness doctrine, though relating to concerns dealing with due process considerations, is not constitutionally based"
<u>Evergreen School District v. School District Organization</u> , 27 Wn. App. 826, 621 P.2d 770 (1980)	County Committee on School District Organization/Adjustment of school district boundaries	Member of school district board which opposed transfer of property to the proponent school district participated as a member of the county committee on school district organization.	Decision to adjust school district boundaries is a discretionary, quasi-legislative determination to which the appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply.
<u>Hayden v. Port Townsend</u> , 28 Wn. App. 192, 622 P.2d 1291 (1981)	Planning Commission/Rezone	Planning commission chairman, who was also branch manager of S & L which had an option to purchase the site in question, stepped down as chairman but participated in the hearing as an advocate of the rezone.	Participation of planning commission chairman as advocate of rezone violated appearance of fairness doctrine.
<u>Somer v. Woodhouse</u> , 28 Wn. App. 262, 623 P.2d 1164 (1981)	Department of Licensing/Adoption of administrative rule	During two rules hearings the Director of the Department of Licensing sat at the head table with the representatives of an organization which was a party to the controversy some of whom argued for adoption of the rule proposed by the department. The minutes of the rules hearings also bore the name of the same organization.	The appearance of fairness doctrine is generally not applicable to a quasi-legislative administrative action involving rule making.

Case	Body/Action	Conflict	Decision
<u>Westside Hilltop Survival Committee v. King County</u> , 96 Wn.2d 171, 634 P.2d 862 (1981)	County Council/Comprehensive plan amendment	Prior to modification of the comprehensive plan there were ex parte contacts between one or two councilmembers and officials of the proponent corporation and two councilmembers had accepted campaign contributions in excess of \$700 from employees of the proponent corporation. These councilmembers actively participated in and voted for adoption of the ordinance modifying the comprehensive plan to allow construction of an office building on a site previously designated as park and open space.	Comprehensive plans are advisory only and a local legislative body's action to determine the contents of such a plan is legislative rather than adjudicatory. Legislative action in land use matters is reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard and is not subject to the appearance of fairness doctrine.
<u>Hoquiam v. PERC</u> , 97 Wn.2d 481, 646 P.2d 129 (1982)	Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC)/Unfair labor practice complaint	Member of PERC was partner in law firm representing union.	Law firm's representation of the union did not violate the appearance of fairness doctrine where commissioner who was a partner in the law firm representing the union disqualified herself from all participation in the proceedings.
<u>Dorsten v. Port of Skagit County</u> , 32 Wn. App. 785, 650 P.2d 220 (1982)	Port Commission/Increase of moorage charges at public marina	Alleged prejudgment bias of commissioner who was an owner or part owner of a private marina in competition with the port's marina.	The port's decision was legislative rather than judicial and the appearance of fairness doctrine did not apply.
<u>Harris v. Hornbaker</u> , 98 Wn.2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983)	Board of County Commissioners/Board's determination of a freeway interchange - adoption of six-year road plan	Alleged prejudgment bias of certain county commissioners.	Deciding where to locate a freeway interchange is a legislative rather than an adjudicatory decision and so the appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply.
<u>Medical Disciplinary Board v. Johnston</u> , 99 Wn.2d 466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983)	Medical Disciplinary Board / Revocation of medical license	Challenge to the same tribunal combining investigative and adjudicative functions, and the practice of assigning a single assistant attorney general as both the board's legal advisor and prosecutor.	The appearance of fairness doctrine is not necessarily violated in such cases. The facts and circumstances in each case must be evaluated to determine whether a reasonably prudent disinterested observer would view the proceeding as a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing and, unless shown otherwise, it must be presumed that the board members performed their duties properly and legally. [In a concurring opinion, Justices Utter, Dolliver, and Dimmick asserted that the majority's analysis of the appearance of fairness doctrine merely reiterates the requirements of due process and thereby causes unnecessary confusion.] [In a dissenting opinion Justices Rosellini and Dore argued that the combination of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within the same tribunal constitutes an appearance of fairness violation.]

Case	Body/Action	Conflict	Decision
<u>Side v. Cheney</u> , 37 Wn. App. 199, 679 P.2d 403 (1984)	Mayor/Promotion of police officer to sergeant	Mayor passed over officer first on civil service promotion list who had also filed for election for position of mayor.	Appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply to mayor who did not act in role comparable to judicial officer. Mayor's promotion decision was not a quasi-judicial decision.
<u>Zehring v. Bellevue</u> , 103 Wn.2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985)	Planning Commission / Design review	Member of commission committed himself to purchase stock in proponent corporation before hearing held in which commission denied reconsideration of its approval of building design.	Appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply to design review because doctrine only applies where a public hearing is required and no public hearing is required for design review. Court vacates its decision in earlier case (<u>Zehring v. Bellevue</u> , 99 Wn.2d 488 (1983), where it held doctrine had been violated.)
<u>West Main Associates v. Bellevue</u> , 49 Wn. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266 (1987)	City council/denial of application for design approval	Councilmember attended meeting held by project opponents and held conversation with people at meeting, prior to planning director's decision and opponent's appeal of that decision to council.	Appearance of fairness doctrine prohibits ex parte communications between public quasi-judicial decision makers only where communication occurs while quasi-judicial proceeding is pending. Since communication at issue occurred one month prior to appeal of planning director's decision to the council, it did not occur during the pendency of the quasi-judicial proceeding and doctrine was thus not violated.
<u>Snohomish County Improvement Alliance v. Snohomish County</u> , 61 Wn. App. 64, 808 P.2d 781 (1991)	County council/denial of application for rezone approval	Two councilmembers received campaign contributions during pendency of appeal.	Contributions were fully disclosed. The contributions were not ex parte communications as there was no exchange of ideas. RCW 42.36.050 provides that doctrine is not violated by acceptance of contribution.
<u>Raynes v. Leavenworth</u> , 118 Wn.2d 237, 821 P.2d 1204 (1992)	City council/amendment of zoning code	Councilmember was real estate agent for broker involved in sale of property to person who was seeking amendment of zoning code. Councilmember participated in council's consideration of proposed amendment.	Text amendment was of area-wide significance. Council action thus was legislative, rather than quasi-judicial. Appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply to legislative action. Limits holding of <u>Fleming v. Tacoma</u> , 81 Wn.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) through application of statutory appearance of fairness doctrine (RCW 42.36.010), which restricts types of decisions classed as quasi-judicial.
<u>Trepanier v. Everett</u> , 64 Wn. App. 380, 824 P.2d 524 (1992)	City council/determination that environmental impact statement not required for proposed zoning ordinance	City both proposed new zoning code and acted as lead agency for SEPA purposes in issuing determination of nonsignificance (DNS).	Person who drafted new code was different from person who carried out SEPA review. In addition, there was no showing of bias or circumstances from which bias could be presumed in council's consideration of legislation proposed by executive.
<u>State v. Post</u> , 118 Wn.2d 596, 837 P.2d 599 (1992)	Community corrections officer/preparation of presentence report	Presentence (probation) officer is an agent of the judiciary; that officer's alleged bias is imparted to judge.	Probation officer is not the decisionmaker at sentencing hearing; judge is. Appearance of fairness does not apply to probation officer. In addition, no actual or potential bias shown.

Case	Body/Action	Conflict	Decision
<u>Jones v. King Co.</u> , 74 Wn. App. 467, 874 P.2d 853 (1994)	County council/area-wide rezone	Action has a high impact on a few people and therefore it should be subject to appearance of fairness doctrine.	Area-wide rezoning constitutes legislative, rather than quasi-judicial action under RCW 42.36.010 regardless of whether decision has a high impact on a few people or whether local government permits landowners to discuss their specific properties.
<u>Lake Forest Park v. Shoreline Hearings Board</u> , 76 Wn. App. 212, 884 P.2d 614 (1994)	Shorelines Hearings Board/shoreline substantial development permit	Reconsideration of the record allegedly prejudiced the SHB against the city.	When acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, judicial officers must be free of any hint of bias. However, a party claiming an appearance of fairness violation cannot indulge in mere speculation, but must present specific evidence of personal or pecuniary interest.
<u>Blarnson v. Kitsap County</u> , 78 Wn. App. 840, 899 P.2d 1290 (1995).	Board of County Commissioners approval of a rezone and planned unit development for a regional shopping center	Ex parte communications during the pendency of the rezone	Any appearance of fairness problems arising from allegedly improper conduct by a member of a decision-making board are cured if the remaining members of the board conduct a rehearing and there is no question of bias or the appearance of bias of the remaining members
<u>OPAL v. Adams County</u> , 128 Wn.2d 869, 913 P.2d 793 (1996)	Board of County Commissioners disapproval of application for an unclassified use permit for a proposed regional solid waste landfill and recycling facility	Ex parte communications between commissioners and an interested party	Challenger must demonstrate that the communication concerned the proposal which is the subject of the quasi-judicial proceeding. Also, the decisionmaker's failure to disclose ex parte communication does not render the administrative decision invalid if the communication has, in fact, been rebutted in the course of the proceedings.
<u>King County v. Central Puget Sound GMHB</u> , 91 Wn. App. 1, 951 P.2d 1151 (1998)	County council/ project permit approval	Councilmembers did not adequately disclose ex parte communications; project opponents allegedly did not have opportunity to rebut.	By not seeking recusal of the councilmembers who had offered what had been alleged as inadequate disclosure of ex parte contacts, the appearance of fairness challenge is waived.
<u>Bunko v. City of Puyallup</u> , 95 Wn. App. 495, __ P.2d __ (1999)	Civil Service Commission order affirming employment termination of police officer	Ex-parte communication with a key witness.	Statutory doctrine applied for first time to matter other than land use. The appearance of fairness doctrine is not violated when ex parte communications do not concern the matter before the quasi-judicial body.

Note: Adapted from a chart originally prepared by Lee Kraft, former City Attorney of Bellevue.
 Court's decision may have rested on grounds other than appearance of fairness doctrine alone, in some cases.

Appendix B

**Selected List of Articles Relating to
Legal Ethics for the City Attorney and
County Prosecuting Attorney and Related Topics**

Selected List of Articles Relating to Legal Ethics for the City Attorney and Prosecuting Attorney and Related Topics

- “The Attorney-Client Privilege in Washington: A Reference Guide,” by Rodney Eng, from MRSC Information Bulletin No. 465, 1989
- “Ethical Representation of Multiple Clients,” by Larry Winner, from MRSC Information Bulletin No. 473, 1992
- “Legal Ethics for Municipal Attorneys - Some Resources and Selected Issues,” by Sandra Cohen, from MRSC Information Bulletin No. 488, 1994
- “The Municipal Attorney - Multiple Clients in City Government with Conflicting Interests,” by Rod Kaseguma, from MRSC Information Bulletin No. 435, 1985
- “The Status of Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product in Municipal Law Practice and Relationship to Public Records Act, “ by Laurie Flinn Connelly, from MRSC Information Bulletin No. 486, 1994
- “Status of the Attorney-Client Privilege Under the Open Meetings Act,” by Robert Hauth, from MRSC Information Bulletin No. 486, 1994
- Representing Elected Officials: How the Elected Official Sees It,” by Kevin Raymond, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys Summer Training Program, 1998
- “Representing the Elected Official,” by Jack Johnson and Quentin Yerxa, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys Summer Training Program, 1998
- “Ethics,” by Randy Gaylord, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys Summer Training Program, 1999
- “Ethics: Everyday Ethical Issues for Government Lawyers: Examining Two Implications of the Central Question: Who is the Client?” by Sandra L. Cohen, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys Summer Training Program, 1998
- “Ethics for Civil Prosecutors,” by Randy Gaylord, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys Summer Training Program, 1998